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Anya Bernstein

SUNY Buffalo Law School

Bureaucratic Speech: Language Choice and Democratic Identity
in the Taipei Bureaucracy
This article illuminates the social nature of bureaucratic practice by analyzing the everyday
speech of bureaucrats in a polyglossic society. My ethnographic analysis shows how Taipei
city government administrators mobilize ideologies associated with Taiwan’s two primary
languages, and stereotypes associated with bureaucracy, to undermine both. Instead, they
present themselves as a postethnonational and postbureaucratic avant-garde of their new
democracy. In doing so, they draw on local values and tropes of legitimation, which place
a premium on the personalistic relations and social imbrication of government actors—
relations that democracy, for all its potential to spawn dangerous chaos, is seen to facilitate.
They represent their government employer not by claiming a superordinate status for it but
by situating it as one participant within a complex of institutions, networks, and values. In
illuminating both the internally and the externally social nature of government bureaucracy,
I highlight the creative and progressive possibilities hidden within the drab government
office. [bureaucracy, democracy, code switching, Taiwan]
“We rarely get so many community residents at a meeting,” said the administrator in charge
to the packed room, “so we can tell that the residents are very earnest and concerned.”
Leaders of the Dali Street Cultural Association, a community activist group from a poor
Taipei neighborhood, sat around the huge table with numerous city government department
representatives.1 The rest of us—around fifteen Cultural Association members—crammed
into the narrow passages left around the table or hopped up onto the windowsills. We were
there to discuss constructing a parking garage under a neighborhood park.
The administrator’s gentle speaking style and little smile struck me as a bit
condescending—a pat on the head from an indulgent teacher. It turned out, though, that I
was the only one who felt so. Unlike me, other Cultural Association members already knew
Mr. Wei from over a decade of activism, starting with their demand for that neighborhood
park—no small request in one of the most densely populated areas of one of the world’s
most densely populated cities.2 Their acquaintance continued with subsequent protests,
ceremonies, celebrations, and projects, like this parking garage plan, which had already
dragged on for five years.3 They had interacted with Mr. Wei at every step on his path to a
high position in the Bureau of Urban Development. Every Cultural Association member I
talked to afterward agreed: he was forthcoming and easy to get along with (hao xiangchu
 [good to encounter]), and had great speaking and negotiation skills (koucai 
[mouth talent]). And after all, the point of having so many Cultural Association members
there—the point of announcing it at the monthly meeting, of the reminder phone calls, of
the group subway trip to city hall—was to demonstrate the residents’ earnest concern.4
Mr. Wei was indicating that the point had been taken.
Not all administrators were so good to encounter. As the association’s community planner—an urban designer working for minimal pay on government-funded
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contracts—informally presented his proposal, a young administrator noted in perfect bureaucratese that the planner’s fiscal estimates were idealistic. Insofar as no exact assessment
of the projected expenditures necessitated by the parking lot had been provided, the young
man’s department would be unable to comment on the proposal at this time. His speech used
the sharp side of etiquette: formal, meticulously polite, and cutting as a knife. The planner,
face reddening, responded in less meticulous tones that parking lots were not his specialty
and that he was expecting the government’s assistance. The exchange continued for a few
more rounds. The administrator got increasingly formal and convoluted; the planner raised
his voice, leaning forward slightly as though about to lunge.
Finally, Mr. Wei intervened: “You just need to give us an estimate,” he said to the
planner. Without disputing the need for fiscal forthrightness, he minimized the gravity of
the situation. “Just call up your colleagues who built that parking lot for National Taiwan
University.” Up to this point, the meeting had been entirely in Mandarin. Mr. Wei continued
in Mandarin, “You just need to ask them”—and then switched into Taiwanese—“‘how much
did it cost?’ That’s all.”5 The community planner straightened, lowered his voice, nodded;
the younger administrator offered no more comments. Mr. Wei’s code-switching utterance
had defused and reoriented the conversation.
Like Mr. Wei’s soft tone and slight smile, his code-switching intervention can inspire
different interpretations. Was he expressing ethnic solidarity by slipping into dialect? Was he
using a “strateg[y] of condescension” to disingenuously stoop to the Cultural Association’s
level (Bourdieu 1991, 68–69)? What roles and relations did his code switch invoke? How
did it figure Mr. Wei and the government that employed him?
In this article, I use bilingual exchanges like Mr. Wei’s efficacious utterance as a springboard to explore the complex social life of a Taiwanese bureaucracy: both the internal
sociality of its everyday life and its external situation within a wider sphere of institutions, values, and networks. I hope to show that utterances such as Mr. Wei’s instantiate
an authentic participation in the social networks in which Taiwanese government authority is embedded—a sociality that forms an integral part of the production of legitimated,
democratic governance in this environment.
Creative language choices revealed that the bureaucrats I studied were working out
their new administrative roles and new relations with their publics. In this, I argue, they
formed an unexpected avant-garde of democratic identity. Indeed, not only interactions
with the public but also “backstage” interactions among bureaucrats were characterized by
creative language choices that presented administrators as postdictatorial professionals at
the vanguard of Taiwan’s developing democracy.
My informants’ creative language use illuminates a more human side to bureaucracy
than anthropological narratives usually reveal and hints at a progressive potential within the
drab government office. Bureaucrats’ resourceful deployment of existing tropes to fashion
new identities and interactional forms also suggests that government bureaucracy is a key
site for understanding, as well as constructing, actually existing democracies.

Bureaucracy, Democracy, and the Taipei Bureau of Urban Development
Government bureaucracy is a somewhat unusual place to look for democratic vanguards.
Bureaucracy has meant many things to many people, but it has rarely meant anything
good.6 For some influential thinkers, bureaucracy instantiates the “abdication of [the]
human initiative and judgment” that is necessary for real democratic politics (Pitkin 1998,
79). It dissipates the human ability to stand out into “a kind of no-man rule” (Arendt 1959,
37). On this view, bureaucracy’s “conflation of politics with administration” obviates the
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possibility of real political participation by subsuming potentially political action under a
systematic rationality that precludes human creativity (Honig 1993, 2).7
It is possible, however, that bureaucracies, like other social institutions, have no single
transhistorical nature. Rather, they may be products of their time and place—albeit ones
that bear some organizational similarities across times and places. As other scholars have
suggested, foundational beginnings, agonistic contestation, and the willful shaping of efficiencies and rationalities into political arguments can take place in office buildings as well
as anywhere else (Honig 1995, 2005; Markell 2006). Perhaps looking for, or assuming,
bureaucracy’s essential, enduring character is not the most fruitful way to study it. It may
be more realistic to understand bureaucracy as a loosely defined organizational form that
bears some similarities across times and places but is also locally integrated and culturally
specific.
Much of that specificity rests on the fact that the bureaucratic “official has characteristics
as a social being beyond those which the administrative code specifies” (Albrow 1970, 55).
Going beyond the merely informal or corrupt, administrators’ unofficial practices can be
patterned in ways that form “new elements of the organization” (Blau 1963, 2–3). In other
words, the state apparatus “is both a semi-autonomous field and one in which the social
properties of state officials and civil servants, which are determined partly outside the state
field, play a key role” (Steinmetz 2014, 1).
Until recently much of the best-known anthropological work on bureaucracy did not
directly address administrators’ practices or self-understandings. For example, Michael
Herzfeld’s (1992) well-known study of bureaucratic indifference draws its data not from
actual bureaucrats but from others’ representations of bureaucrats. Bureaucrat appears
as a category of person, much like an ethnicity, about which Herzfeld’s informants offer stereotypes. Similarly, Akhil Gupta “attempt[s] to do an ethnography of the state by
examining . . . discourses of corruption” (1995, 375), rather than by examining the practices or self-conceptions of state actors. Bureaucracy is thus often presented as an object of
(negative) social commentary rather than a social field of its own.
The last decade, however, has seen a renewed interest in bureaucrats and their micropractices as objects of ethnographic study (Bernstein and Mertz 2011). Recent scholarship
has looked at government policies as social forces that affect both their objects and their
creators, and scholars have become increasingly interested in the interpenetration of government bureaucracies and the social worlds in which they function (Shore et al. 2011).
Studies have shown how documents, information, ideas, and people move through government organizations, creating networks, identities, and values in ways that specify and
expand Weber’s (1978) foundational ideal type of rational administration (Cabot 2012;
Hoag 2010; Hull 2012; Latour 2010).
As Matthew Hull writes, understanding bureaucracy involves “understand[ing] collectivization and individuation as simultaneous functions of the same bureaucratic process,
taking neither the agency of the individual nor the organization as given” (2012, 129–130).
In a similar way, a bureaucratic agency itself is constituted both by its own internal
social relations and by its external relations to other institutions. These relations construct
bureaucracy as a particular, separate field of social activity. However, they also integrate
bureaucracy into a broader social world. Moreover, as Jessica Greenberg (2014) notes, a
newly democratized state apparatus can offer a site for particularly creative forms of political action. As old political conventions and values are thrown into question with the advent
of a new political system, participants may deploy existing tropes in new ways to “change
the terms of politics” in ways that remain “socially resonant and historically meaningful” in
their particular contexts (7). I build on such work to illuminate how administrators marshal
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cultural stereotypes to create something new: an agentive, individualized bureaucratic
identity that embraces a particular local understanding of democratic legitimacy.
In doing so, I place bureaucracy squarely at the center of democracy—not because
bureaucracy is necessarily democratic, of course, but because bureaucracy is necessary to
any modern democracy. The Taipei Bureau of Urban Development, where I situate my
ethnography, allows for an exploration of the social life of a democratic bureaucracy. As
the city’s primary administrators of urban space, bureau employees regularly interact with
numerous publics, as well as with the elected legislators who control their budget and
mayors who set their policy. They are the objects of public demands and imprecations.
They initiate projects that require cooperation from private actors and other government
agents.8 They also ameliorate disputes between the city council and the mayor—disputes
that are themselves a recent epiphenomenon of multiparty, democratic elections. Bureau
administrators are aware of the tension between their popular image as power-hogging
tyrants and their everyday practices as implementers of Taiwan’s new governmental system. Indeed, many office conversations revolve around that tension. For all these reasons,
Bureau of Urban Development administrators form an integral part of the development of
a specifically Taiwanese democratic bureaucracy.
Of course, the image I present is particular, as any ethnographic image must be. First, the
office I describe is located in a city government. Its administrators likely have more regular
interaction with broader swaths of the public than those working in the central government,
and they may be more explicitly beholden to the legislature. At the same time, this city
government is closely connected to the national one. Taipei is Taiwan’s political, economic,
and population center. The Taipei mayoralty is seen as a stepping-stone to national political
positions (the last two presidents were first Taipei mayors), and the city bureaucracy is
often a stop along a career path leading to the central government. This makes possible a
level of integration beyond what one might expect in countries with a greater number of
key cities. That means that the conduct and understandings of city government employees
likely have implications beyond the city government. In a larger sense, of course, the
Taipei municipal administration forms—both conceptually and organizationally—one part
of the greater social structure that can be broadly described as “the state” (see Martin 2013,
617).
Second, many of the bureau’s administrators would not claim to represent all Taiwanese
bureaucrats. On the contrary, they often describe themselves as enthusiastic innovators, in
contrast to other bureaucrats in other places and times. In some sense, this very contrast
enabled my ethnography; the fact that the bureau leadership allowed a foreign researcher to
participate in everyday administrative activities speaks to its openness. At the same time,
given the regular personnel flow to the central government, these bureaucrats are good
candidates for high-status central positions later in their careers. In other words, while they
may be somewhat special, they are neither anomalous nor marginal.
Third, my ethnography reveals a way of bureaucratic being that is situated in the specific
history, culture, and social structures of Taiwan. I would not claim that all bureaucracies
are like the one I describe. Any theorization of bureaucracy, however, should be able to
accommodate the kinds of social relations and values that my ethnography reveals. I hope
that my discussion illuminates some creative possibilities within bureaucratic action that
anthropological accounts often overlook.
The Politics of Language Choice in Taiwanese Bureaucracies
Mr. Wei’s efficacious utterance, which started off this article, combined Taiwan’s two
primary languages. Taiwanese, the island’s majority language, is a local version of the
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Southern Min dialect spoken in China’s Fujian Province, from which migrants came to
Taiwan from the seventeenth century until Japan colonized the island from 1895 to 1945.9
After World War II, the victorious Allies ended Japanese colonization. They gave control
of the island to the Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT (Guomindang ), which
had been formed in China while Taiwan was under colonial rule and, by the 1940s, was
recognized as China’s governing power. The KMT took possession of Taiwan during the
late stages of its civil war with the Chinese Communists. As the Communists took control
of China in 1949, an estimated two million people, many associated with the KMT, fled to
Taiwan.
Declaring the KMT the legitimate government of China in temporary exile, government
discourse and practice largely ignored the island in favor of the mainland. For instance, an
average of 85 percent of national expenditures went to national security in the first fifteen
years of KMT rule, leaving little for nondefensive development (Gold 1986, 69; Huang
2005). After the bloody repression of a 1947 uprising, the KMT instituted martial law
in 1949. Years of intensive persecution of local elites cemented an emerging distinction
between those whose families came to Taiwan before Japanese colonialism began in 1895
and those who arrived during or after the Chinese Revolution, in the 1940s.10 This distinction
between “Taiwanese” people and “Mainlanders” continues to be the island’s most salient
ethnicized difference (Kerr 1965; Phillips 2003).
As state violence receded, the two groups retained different residential patterns and
different routes to success, with Taiwanese joining the “traditional” middle class of smallscale entrepreneurs, and with Mainlanders forming a “new” middle class employed in
government and larger businesses, often connected to the KMT (Gates 1981, 273–80; Kuo
2000). The KMT made Mandarin Chinese the language of the state and the public sphere.11
This helped shut the local Taiwanese, who had grown up speaking Taiwanese and Japanese,
out of positions of power. Schools taught students about China rather than Taiwan (Chun
1996; Heylen 2001), and children were beaten for speaking Taiwanese in school.
The distribution of language and power in the public sphere led to enduring conceptual
linkages. In local language ideologies, Mandarin was connected to formal interactions,
public and official sites, power, and status; while Taiwanese was linked to intimacy, small
business, the home, disempowerment, and lack of status (Berg 1982, 1988; Huang 1988;
Kubler 1985, 1988; Young et al. 1992). These conceptual associations remain prevalent in
both scholarship and everyday conversation, even as the distribution of both languages and
power have changed dramatically.12
State agencies started actively hiring Taiwanese people in the late 1970s.13 This localization (bentuhua  [this-land-ization]) was part of a long-term political transformation
responding to both internal and external pressures. Domestically, the Taiwanese democracy movement became increasingly vocal in the late 1970s and 1980s. Internationally, the
United Nations (in 1971) and United States (in 1978) officially recognized the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), withdrawing diplomatic recognition from Taiwan and the KMT’s
claim to be the legitimate government of China. This put pressure on the KMT party-state
to differentiate itself from the PRC and demonstrate its democratic bona fides. The KMT
lifted martial law in 1986–1987. It instituted multiparty popular elections at all levels of
government in 1994 and in 2000 participated in its first peaceful transfer of power, to the
previously oppositional Democratic Progressive Party (Minjindang ).
Through all this, democracy activism maintained a significant ethnonationalist aspect.
By framing democratization as an ethnonational awakening and a demand for specifically
ethnic equality, the movement both built on, and helped solidify, the terms of identity
politics (Huang 1995; Rigger 1999).
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Members of the emerging opposition often pointedly spoke Taiwanese in public settings,
strove to increase people’s awareness of Taiwanese (rather than Chinese) history and culture,
and generally tried to reverse the KMT-imposed value hierarchy, which valorized indexes
of the mainland, like Mandarin. In keeping with this push, increasing avenues for popular
participation in state institutions have gone hand in hand with the promotion of localism as
both a goal of, and a legitimating basis for, political action (Bernstein 2006; Chuang 2005;
Huang 1995). The history of Taiwan is now taught in schools, and Taiwanese is allowed in
all settings, sometimes taught in schools, and often used in political proceedings. Indeed,
politicians are now sure to be able to give at least a snippet of a speech in Taiwanese, lest
they be accused of harboring a martial law mentality or “not loving Taiwan” (bu ai Taiwan
ÿ).
Decades of intermarriage and cohabitation, common education, and the integration of
Taiwanese language into popular culture and Taiwanese people into government have left
most of the country effectively bilingual. In my fieldwork, even Mandarin speakers who
described themselves as incapable of speaking Taiwanese could communicate in it when
called upon to do so.14 While ethnic background once structured educational and career
opportunities, my interlocutors increasingly connected each language to particular activities
more than to particular ethnicities.
Language ability was thus generally seen as fluid, something one could develop
rather than something one was stuck with.15 For example, a Mainlander friend who
had spent her adult life working in a big company where she spoke only her native
Mandarin started to learn Taiwanese when she left her job to open her own pub. She had
joined the ranks of small entrepreneurs, which made speaking Taiwanese appropriate.
In this sense, Mandarin and Taiwanese may be in the process of becoming registers
rather than dialects (Irvine 2001)—connected to social roles more than to ethnic
identities.
The democracy movement fought structural inequalities between Taiwanese and
Mainlanders; its success largely eliminated them. The unequal, repressive situation
that formed the backdrop to calls for ethnonational awakening and empowerment has
largely disappeared, replaced by ongoing debate about origins, traditions, and political
definitions that increasingly focuses not on ethnicized distinctions at home but on Taiwan’s
seemingly irresolvable relationship to mainland China.16 Linguistically, this process
has given rise to an everyday life where people habitually utilize a range of expressive
possibilities.
Anthropologists often look for what Susan Gal calls “unauthorized vernacular forms”
that “enact values . . . [that] oppos[e] the dominant value” (1987, 638). However, in Taiwan’s
case, rather than inverting the old value hierarchy and placing Taiwanese in an authoritative
position over Mandarin, the country’s ongoing political transformation has resulted in
a diffusion of authoritative values. That makes it difficult to assign either language a
clear position in a political economy. Taiwan’s linguistic arena is now characterized by the
absence of a clear hierarchy through which to define “unauthorized,” as against “dominant,”
forms.
In the city government, for example, functional bilingualism is both a widespread fact
and effectively a job requirement. To pass the civil service exams needed to enter government employment, an applicant must have excellent Mandarin; Taiwanese is not technically
required for government employment. Nevertheless, an inability to speak Taiwanese well
is considered a professional impediment, because administrators are expected to accommodate the preferences of their nongovernmental interlocutors with respect to Mandarin
and Taiwanese.17
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Some commentators have felt that Taiwan’s polyglossia “constantly creates the problem
of what code to choose” (Berg 1988, 253). In contrast, my interlocutors seemed to see
opportunities, not problems, in the range of expressive options available to them (Bakhtin
1982; Gal 2011; Woolard 1999). Moreover, the combination of universal bilingualism with
a shared history of the politicization of language made language choice a key site for the
construction of political identity.18
Social Life in a Bureaucracy
Like other parts of Taipei City Hall, the Bureau of Urban Development is usually abuzz.
Administrators gather around desks and lean over the low barrier that separates the walkway
from the office area to chat. Other people butt in good-naturedly, calling out questions,
information, and playful insults across the open office space. There is almost constant
over-the-barrier and across-the-room chatter. Every few weeks a colleague comes around
to distribute little cakes—customary presents given by people who just got engaged, are
about to get married, or have recently had a child (Adrian 2003; Wolf 1968). Such people
are invariably subjected to teasing on the subject of their good fortune, usually followed by
discussions of party venues, daycare options, the changing role of the daughter-in-law in
Taiwanese society, or other relevant topics.
Other factors enhance office social integration. Many administrators graduate from a
small number of feeder schools.19 These graduates often know, or know of, one another
long before they come to the city government. Common school background carries great
significance in Taiwan, where graduates of the same department refer to and sometimes even
address one another with modified kinship terms,20 and classmates are generally presumed
to have close relations.21 New hires enter a flurry of social activity as their subsection head,
section head, graduates of their university department, and other connected coworkers take
turns inviting them out for lunch with groups of colleagues.
Most administrators are, in other words, visible and audible; and they tend to know
one another’s business. Groups of current and former coworkers sing karaoke together,
go hiking together, know one another’s families, visit each other on holidays. This is not
exceptional. As my interlocutors across socioeconomic and educational groups confirmed,
the interpenetration of social and professional lives is both widespread and assumed in
Taiwan. In other words, administrators are not friends because they form an elite class but
because they are coworkers, and coworkers, generally speaking, tend to be friends. The
“backstage,” or internal, social life of this bureaucracy was thus highly active.
In addition, administrators were visible and audible not just to one another, but also to
members of the general public who came to the office looking for help. The Bureau of
Urban Development was not designed for such interaction. It has no general reception area;
its secretaries do not look up inquiringly when someone enters; there is no indication of
which administrator works on which project.22 Nevertheless, members of the public find
their way there all the time, stopping someone in the hall or sticking their heads over a
barrier, calling out a question to whoever looks up. They then go from answer to answer
until they find someone with relevant information, who will typically interrupt whatever he
or she is doing to help them.
Social life in the Bureau of Urban Development, in other words, is packed. Moreover,
administrators actively participate in the society they regulate. They are subject to the same
trends, witness the same stereotypes, and hold the same widely shared social values as
their nongovernmental neighbors. Administrators often took their constant interaction with
one another and the public as opportunities for creative self-presentation, using language
tropes and the stereotypes associated with them to fashion administrative identities that
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rejected those very stereotypes. Such usages also drew on multiple, simultaneous arenas
of institutional belonging, presenting administrators as not only government actors but
also as participants in a variety of social relations and institutions that endure over time.
Acknowledging, even valorizing, both their professional status and their multiple institutional belonging was central to these administrators’ self-construction as the nation’s new
democratic bureaucrats.
Postethnonational Identities of Postbureaucratic Bureaucrats
The city administrators I worked with identified the return of popular mayoral elections
to Taipei in 1994 as the turning point for their profession (Bernstein 2008, 944).23 As
an appointed official, one section head explained, “you don’t care whether [the public]
supports you,24 [but those who] depend on the public for votes . . . have to listen to it.”25
Mr. An, an administrator working on urban renewal in the Dali Street area, contrasted
the two eras. Instead of staying in the office, Mr. An would stop by neighborhood gathering
places—the benches around the local temple, the rice store, and the little triangle of trees
next to the power station—to chat with people. This would not have been possible before
elected mayors.
Before, the government decided for itself what people wanted: “The government has given you a park, what else do you want?” But we discovered that
a lot of times, we’d put in a park and then nobody would use it. Because we
hadn’t asked people . . . what they wanted from a park.
Although Mr. An was also the object of the Dali Street Cultural Association’s demands,
both he and Cultural Association members told me that neighborhood residents went to
his wedding,26 and that after he had a child, some Dali Street “community moms” (shequ
mama x) made him oily rice (youfan ), the traditional dish celebrating a son’s
first month of life. Fellow administrators in the bureau’s central office also spoke with
admiration of Mr. An’s work; he was described as a key figure in the revitalization of the
city’s old, poor, crowded core.
Note how the public’s relations with bureaucratic administration are figured in
Mr. An’s description. While martial law separates state from society, democracy opens
up the possibility of greater personal relations with the objects of regulation. Through this
increasing interaction with specific publics, the administrator becomes implicated in new
relationships that coexist with his obligations and loyalty to the government.
Within some conceptions of democratic values, such close relationships between bureaucrats and regulated parties could be described as corruption or capture.27 People I talked
with in Taiwan—not just activists and administrators but also teachers, entrepreneurs,
academics, office workers, culture industry participants, and other acquaintances—never
described these things in that way.28 The increased connection of administrators with
administered was universally described in positive terms. It enhanced the government’s
claim to legitimate power and ameliorated the potentially chaotic effects of democratic
pluralism.29
As Jeffrey Martin has written, “Taiwan’s historical transition to democracy valorized
the cultural trope of particularism”—that is, biographically specific individual relations—
“as a defining quality of legitimate force” (2013, 639). Rather than corrupting or capturing
Mr. An, his close social relations with the people under his regulatory purview enhanced his
ability to perform the Janus-faced role of every administrator: representing his government
to its people and his people to their government.
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Administrators were also attuned to the reputations they had to live down. My coworkers
compared our department favorably to departments in other cities and other times, whose
administrators were said to be more “bureaucratic” (guanliao ), meaning lazy, obstructionist, and hierarchical; “harder” (ying ), meaning nitpicky and legalistic; and more
“traditional” (chuantong ), meaning corrupt. The need to show the public that the department had moved beyond these martial-law-era traits came up regularly in discussions
of policy implementation, which was universally understood to require negotiation and
consensus-creation (Bernstein 2008).
For example, Mr. Ke, a section head, explained how he had convinced a particularly
intransigent group of landowners to negotiate rezoning their area: “Bureaucrats all used to
take money, want to eat, want to drink,” he explained. When he and a subordinate first met
with these landowners, “they invited us to eat—we ate simple lunch boxes. They invited us
to drink—we drank water. Do you know how moved they were? They’d never seen bureaucrats like us. So after that they felt bad fighting with us.”30 Choosing a brown-bag lunch
with water over a banquet with alcohol differentiated these administrators from their martial
law predecessors in ways that made negotiation, and therefore policy implementation,
possible.
Stereotypes also fed the pool of inspiration for the office’s ubiquitous self-mocking
humor. After shadowing one gregarious, devoted administrator for several days, I asked
him how it felt to be free of me. “I’ve already cussed out a bunch of the public,”31 he
replied gleefully, as though it had only been my presence that had inhibited his normal
bureaucratic arrogance. Another time, when I expressed surprise that my coworkers
did not know the English word “bribe,” one administrator replied with mock gravity,
in English: “That is because when we take bribes, we do not speak English.” The
negative attributes commonly attributed to bureaucrats were thus ever present as a point of
contrast: something to define oneself in opposition to, something to riff off in service of a
joke.
Within this context, the universal availability of both languages, and the widely held
language ideology linking Mandarin with officialdom and Taiwanese with intimacy, gave
administrators a flexible tool for nuanced self-expression through which to contrast themselves from undesirable stereotypes. It allowed for moments of personal, interlocutorspecific footing in otherwise standard interactions, as when a senior official chairing
a meeting, without appearing to interrupt a participant who was addressing her in
Mandarin, called out to a latecomer in Taiwanese, “Come, come, come, sit here, sit here!”32
This bilingual byplay (Goffman 1981)—side conversations not perceived to interrupt the
primary goings-on—allowed her to occupy simultaneously a position of formality (with
respect to the administrator speaking Mandarin) and one of informality (with respect to
the latecomer). Similarly, administrators often called others to shared office telephones
using Taiwanese nicknames,33 acknowledging one another’s everyday selves even as they
conducted government business.
Administrators also often used different languages to contrast causes or initial events
with effects or subsequent events in ways that highlighted distinctions between the speaker
and others. For example, Ms. Gu, a midlevel administrator, delivered a diatribe to some
coworkers about administrators from another department. It is not that they had worse
training, she explained in Mandarin, it is just that they did not think broadly or comprehensively: “If you say one, they can’t say two.”34 They were used to simply doing what they
are told. She began another explanation in Mandarin: “If the [supervisor] isn’t there, the
project just”—and concluded in Taiwanese—“goes on by itself.” Again starting in Mandarin: “There’s no change, and then it just”—and again concluding in Taiwanese—“dies.”35
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In this typical code-switch pattern, one language emphasized the results of conditions expressed in the other.
Ms. Gu was herself a native Taiwanese speaker who spoke a highly Taiwanese-inflected
Mandarin. In this example, though, she presented the undesired result—projects running
rudderless into the ground—in Taiwanese. The Mandarin–Taiwanese contrast, in other
words, did not express her sense of ethnic differentiation from the people she described. It
expressed a professional distance between her breed of active, thoughtful bureaucrat and
those who conformed to negative stereotypes. Ms. Gu wrapped up her diatribe by using this
same resultative code switch for a modest proposal that drew uproarious laughter: “First,” in
formal, pretentiously correct Mandarin, “send out invitations and officially invite everyone
to come [to a meeting], well and then”—in Taiwanese—“kill them all.”36
To similar effect, administrators used code switches to contrast their own narrated speech
from that of others in the narration. For instance, Chuanzong, a low-level administrator
tasked with ensuring that another department received some money that had mistakenly
been sent to the Bureau of Urban Development, recounted his experience to colleagues.
He began in Mandarin: “I contacted the accountant, asked how to fix [this].”37 Framing
the accountant’s response in Mandarin, he continued, “Well, the accountant said . . . ”—
Chuanzong then switched to Taiwanese to voice that response—“‘Well, I don’t know.’”38
He returned to Mandarin for indirect reported speech—“[The accountant] told me to contact
the section head”39 —and again he framed the speech in Mandarin. “Well, the section head
said”—but again gave the direct reported speech in Taiwanese—“‘Well, I don’t know.’”40
Chuanzong continued with this contrastive style throughout his narration of his long (and
increasingly loud) telephone conversation, during which he had been transferred up and
down a department whose employees seemed bafflingly uninterested in recovering its
money. He used Mandarin for his own narrative and utterances but Taiwanese for the
utterances of his interlocutors.
Chuanzong used the contrast between Mandarin and Taiwanese as a metapragmatic
framing device, a quotation mark setting off others’ utterances from his own voice. Far
from an iconic representation, this was a stylistic choice: in fact, his interlocutors had
also spoken Mandarin. The contrast between the languages gave him an understood,
but unstated, way to distinguish himself from the kind of bureaucrats he had found
on the other end of the line: people who did not care about getting things done but
only wanted to make complications go away. Chuanzong did not draw on associations
of Mandarin with formality and Taiwanese with informality; his particular frustration
did not revolve around that contrast. Rather, his language choice allowed for a lively
narrative style that distinguished between different kinds of equally formal behavior,
highlighting the absurdity of the situation in a way his chuckling audience clearly
appreciated.
The availability of different languages and stereotypes gave administrators a way to enact
differentiated personalities that exceeded their job descriptions, allowing them to occupy
variegated social roles. For instance, one rather serious male administrator once asked his
colleague a perfectly normal question: “When is your meeting?” He did so using a sing-song
voice, with a slow cadence and exaggerated tones, perfectly mimicking a style associated
with children, cartoons, and sajiao —a hyperfeminized, pouty affectation popular
among young women speaking to intimates (example 1). His addressee, a jolly father of
two, imitated his little-girl cuteness in response. The meeting set for that afternoon had
been rescheduled for the following day. To make the first line of his response rhyme with
the first line of the question, he made it comically ungrammatical—though still perfectly
comprehensible (example 2).
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1. A-cho! A-cho!
[Taiwanese-derived nickname]
Li siammi sizun beh khuihoe?
You what time will meet?
(A-cho! A-cho! When is your meeting?)
2. E-bo! E-bo!
Afternoon! Afternoon!
Bo khuihoe ah, minachai chia u.
no meet PERF, tomorrow only have.
(In the afternoon! In the afternoon!)
(There’s no meeting anymore, not until tomorrow.)
These speakers subtly manipulated everyday office interactions to show that they were
youthful, lively, popularly-cultured guys, not reducible to interchangeable cogs in a bureaucratic machine. Administrators often slipped into this kind of play-acting, which drew on the
idealized speech forms of children and intimate relationships, often depicted on television,
to invoke the informality associated with Taiwanese. More than that, it drew participants
into a mutually constructed scene, an interlocutor-specific interactional alternative to the
conventional information exchange that office life often necessitates. Administrators thus
mobilized commonly recognized stereotypes to present themselves—and to recognize one
another—as individuals who exceeded stereotypes.
In contrast to the monologic drone often attributed to government employees (Errington
1995), administrators in the Taipei city government creatively used language contrast and
stereotypy as tools for constructing new ways of being appropriate to their new government.
Popular language ideologies continue to associate Mandarin with formality and the state,
and Taiwanese with informality and the intimate. Administrators drew on these associations
to inject formal, governmental situations with elements of intimacy and individuality,
using stereotypes of language speakers to undermine stereotypes of haughty, distant, and
corrupt bureaucrats. Their use of expectations, jokes, byplay, and role-play instantiated their
common construction of what might be called a postbureaucratic professional identity,
which would balance their role in the bureaucracy with their membership in a democracy,
and incorporate the densely social and intensely personal nature of bureaucratic life.
Language Choice and Multiple Network Construction
The code switching styles described above valorized both administrators’ professionalism
and their embeddedness in institutions, networks, and relations that exceeded the city
government. Such code-switching intimacies, moreover, were not reserved for “backstage”
relations among administrators. They extended to “onstage” interactions with the public. In
this context, government action acknowledged as legitimate by both participants and broader
publics did not eschew personalistic relations; it was based on, and depended on, them. It
was through developing long-term affective relations with residents that Mr. An gained the
trust of local activists and urban administrators alike. It was by demonstrating his heartfelt
earnestness and uprightness that Mr. Ke—the section head who refused banquets and
alcohol—brought local landlords to the negotiating table. It was in enacting multidirectional
solidarity that Mr. Wei managed the conflict that started off this article.
I want to return to Mr. Wei’s code switch now, to consider the different interpretations it
gives rise to and their implications for the position of city government bureaucrats within
their larger social surround. Recall that Mr. Wei said in Mandarin, “You just need to
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give us an estimate. Just call up your colleagues who built that parking lot for National
Taiwan University and ask them. You just need to ask them”—and here he switched into
Taiwanese—“‘How much did it cost?’ That’s all.”
By describing the situation in Mandarin but giving an imaginary quotation in Taiwanese,
Mr. Wei used the common trope, described above, of framing hypothetical speech in one
language and then voicing it in another. He minimized the issue’s importance by using
“just” (zhi ) (“You just need to ask them”). He then summed up the situation with “that’s
all” (soah soah khi), an expression that appears at the end of a suggestion to convey an easy
finality to a potentially difficult decision. It has a similar emotional impact to American
English “forget about it” or “who cares?,” though it plays a different grammatical role.
Although not slang, it is usually used among familiars. In the typical code-switching
pattern, Mr. Wei might have used Taiwanese to report the community planner’s imagined
speech, then expressed his own evaluation that this was “not a big deal” with the parallel
Mandarin term suanle . Instead, he stayed in Taiwanese, completing one of the very
few non-Mandarin utterances used in the meeting.
One traditional way to explain the efficacy of Mr. Wei’s utterance is to look at the
ethnic associations of the languages in use. Local language ideologies continue to link
Mandarin to Mainlanders, and Taiwanese language to ethnically Taiwanese people
(Tu 1996). Perhaps Mr. Wei was expressing ethnic solidarity with his interlocutors. In
reality, though, not only were Mr. Wei and the community planner ethnically Taiwanese
native speakers but so also was almost everyone else in the room, including most of the
administrators.41 Mr. Wei’s intervention is thus difficult to read as invoking ethnicized
groupness.
From another perspective, Mr. Wei’s dip into Taiwanese recalls Bourdieu’s dialectspeaking Béarnais mayor. In what Bourdieu calls a “strateg[y] of condescension,” the
mayor appears to temporarily abdicate his authoritative position by deigning to use the
local dialect in a speech (1991, 68–69). Garnering public praise for using the dialect instead
of standard French, the mayor sneakily enhances his position by appearing to degrade it;
using the dialect, after all, does not change the fact of the mayor’s power or his role as
representative of the very authority that renders French standard.
As Bourdieu notes, the efficaciousness of a strategy of condescension depends on institutional conditions: a strategy of condescension requires a position of superiority from which
to condescend. This is, indeed, how the speech of government employees is often presented
(Errington 1995): they animate government utterances unto their passively receiving, if
resentful, populace. If Mr. Wei’s speech primarily indexed participants’ relative positions
within the bureaucracy, then his use of unofficial language in an official setting would fit
the bill perfectly. Deputy Chief Engineer Wei had, by far, the highest bureaucratic status of
anyone in the room. His code switch appeared to bring him closer to people outside—and
implicitly below—the bureaucratic hierarchy, gracing them with the legitimation vested in
him to convey while maintaining his authority over them, even sneakily enhancing it by
enforcing a much-valued consensus.
It is not obvious, however, that city government administrators held the kind of institutional power that would give them a secure place from which to condescend. My coworkers
never talked about simply enforcing the law or implementing government policy. Through
expressions of earnest concern, frequent social interactions, and practical demonstrations
of solidarity, they put considerable effort into convincing people that the government they
represented was worthy of respect and cooperation (Bernstein 2008). This reciprocal dependence of government institutions and civil society groups is not unique; as Patchen
Markell has written, the unidirectional flow of speech and recognition is one way that state
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institutions appear to set the terms of recognition while obscuring the state’s own reciprocal
need for recognition from the people under its purview (2003, 30).
In Taiwan’s new democratic order, civil society groups do depend on the government for
recognition and funding. However, they also exert influence through things like organized
demands bolstered by a decades-long rhetoric valorizing the “local” (Chuang 2004, 2005;
Huang 2005) and a vibrant, ongoing discussion of the nature of democracy, all undergirded by savvy media use.42 Moreover, as discussed above, long-term, affective, interpersonal relations lay at the heart of legitimated government authority. From this perspective,
Mr. Wei’s speech indexed not a predictable institutional power over extrainstitutional actors but a larger social sphere that incorporates the state as one of a number of institutions
striving for validation. In that sense, one might see Mr. Wei’s speech as another kind of
strategy: not of condescension but of legitimation.
Moreover, the bureaucratic hierarchy in which Mr. Wei held a high position was not the
only politically efficacious institution in the room. The Dali Street Cultural Association
had succeeded in pushing through many of its demands on the city government.43 Part
of this success came from the group’s ability to mobilize broad social networks. Despite
their low socioeconomic status, residents—like many people—were closely tied to elected
government officials. In Taiwan’s highly personalistic electoral system, individual voters
are often connected to both municipal and national representatives by relatively short chains
of personal relations, often mediated through thiau-ah kha, a Taiwanese word that translates
as “support post.” These vote-gatherers use affective relations and skillful speech (as well
as, sometimes, monetary incentives) to persuade others to vote for their candidates (Lin
1996; Moon 1998; Rigger 1999).44
Several Dali Street Cultural Association members had close relations with city and
national legislators. At least one member acted as a vote-gatherer for an active, wellknown city councilor. By the logic of the power of the purse—the city council sets the city
administration’s budget—this translated into a certain influence on the city government.
Moreover, one of the country’s three main newspapers is headquartered in the neighborhood,
giving the Cultural Association a reliable media platform.
Such social skills and ties, reminiscent of those required of small-scale entrepreneurs
(Greenhalgh 1984, 1995; Hamilton and Kao 1990), are crucial for political activists
in Taiwan’s highly personalized political world (Chuang 2004, 2005; Weller 1999). It
is widely agreed both within and without the city government, for example, that the
Dali Street Cultural Association played an important part in defeating then-mayor Chen
Shui-bian’s reelection bid in 1998. The neighborhood leaned heavily toward Chen’s
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, showed
more interest in the Cultural Association’s plans, however, members encouraged other
residents to vote for him instead, and he carried the otherwise reliably DPP neighborhood.
As one Cultural Association member told me with a chuckle, “We’re very famous in the city
government.”45
Acknowledging these multiple paths to power opens another vantage on Mr. Wei’s
Taiwanese code switch, which indexed his position in a social world populated by people
with different forms of, and routes to, sociopolitical efficacy. As much as his use of Taiwanese may have served to enhance his power through condescension, it also acknowledged
that his was not the only power in the room. Perhaps more than condescension, then, it was
a strategy of concession.
This meeting, moreover, was merely one step in a long dance. Cultural Association
members had gotten to know Mr. Wei over years of engagement with the city government.
Although his administrative position had changed several times, his personality was seen
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as stable. He was known as a sympathetic, helpful person in a cultural context in which
formal, rule-bound, standardized relationships are less valued than informal, customary,
and particularized ones (Martin 2013; Winn 1994). Mr. Wei’s authority rested, then, partly
on acquaintance, biographic background, and individual personality traits.
When Mr. Wei summed up his suggestion with the no-big-deal Taiwanese modal soah
soah khi (“that’s all”), he negated the younger administrator’s suggestion that the discussion could not go forward, disrupting his ying (unyielding) and guanliao (bureaucratic)
performance. He invoked instead an ethical universe with values focused not on legality
or accuracy but on mutual aid and its concomitant mutual obligation—sentiments seen as
properly characterizing long-term relationships of all sorts in Taiwan (Deglopper 1995;
Martin 2007). Making good on his positive reputation, Mr. Wei might be described as
bolstering his ability to enact his individual self in a government-based interaction through
a strategy of individuation.
Condescension, legitimation, concession, individuation: all are plausible readings of the
import of Mr. Wei’s Taiwanese use. They also may all have a place in his single utterance.
The complex matrix of interactive institutions, social values, and personal relationships
within which Mr. Wei spoke undermines any claim to a single correct interpretation. As a
city administrator, he represented the government charged with managing his interlocutors
at the same time as he needed their cooperation, was subject to their power, and was
embedded in long-term personal relationships with them. Mr. Wei’s utterance thus indexed
multiple, related constellations of social roles and relationships. These included, at the
least, the nexus of city administrative units charged with managing both the spaces of the
city and the relations of the city’s people with its government; his own self-presentation
as a helpful and approachable administrator; the widespread social ideal of consensus; and
his personal ongoing relations with Dali Street neighborhood residents.
In short, his utterance presented him not as a unidimensional bureaucrat but as a multidimensional individual embedded in numerous institutions and relations. Far from imposing
a single import on his words, his bureaucratic position implicated him in multiple subject
positions that lent his speech an intrinsic multivalence. This multivalent, social, and affective self-presentation, I have argued, is a hallmark of Taipei administrators’ developing
identity as democratic bureaucrats.
Conclusions and Implications
Using the lens of code switching and other forms of bureaucratic speech, I have presented
Taipei administrators as self-consciously embedded in multiple sociopolitical institutions
and networks. I show how they creatively invoke interpersonal relationships, longstanding
values and loyalties, and cultural understandings and stereotypes to construct an emerging
identity of a bureaucrat suited to a specifically Taiwanese democracy.
My interlocutors drew on language ideologies and common stereotypes, as well as a
little-noted local tendency to connect languages to situations rather than to ethnicities.
They deployed these tools to distance themselves from common negative images of administrators as hard, bureaucratic, and traditional—that is, legalistic, hierarchical, and
corrupt—presenting themselves instead as flexible, personable, and earnest. Language
choice, I have claimed, provides a particularly fruitful lens through which to view these
practices because of the deep and well-known imbrication of political rule and political
ideology with language use over Taiwan’s last century.
The way that community activists, landowners, and sometimes-contentious interlocutors
reacted to such displays indicates that such self-presentation was often successful. Lacking
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the martial-law-era ability to simply impose policy on a passive public, these administrators
were often effective at a more complex, democratic style of authority. Externally, they forged
long-term interpersonal relations with the private parties under their purview, enticing and
cajoling them into negotiating over local projects and government initiatives. Internally,
they supported one another in constructing postbureaucratic professional identities that
reflected values they shared with their publics.
As I have suggested, the particular kind of bureaucratic identity I found in Taipei City
Hall departed in important ways from the Weberian ideal-type and many scholarly presentations. Neither government employees nor publics, for example, viewed the proper role
of administrators as defined by their job descriptions. Nor did anyone suggest that administrators were, or should be, interchangeable based on their institutional positions. On the
contrary, personal characteristics and personalistic relationships were central aspects of
how administrators were able to get things done; and they were explicitly valued by both
bureaucrats and the people they administered.
Relatedly, the idea that administrators should owe exclusive loyalty to the government
that employed them was discursively tied to a martial-law-era approach to governance.
Democratized city bureaucrats, in contrast, were assumed to be, and supposed to be,
embedded in multiple social spheres that shared claims on their sense of obligation. In this
sense, the Taipei bureaucrats I worked with were adjusting to emerging ideas of government
legitimacy based squarely in Taiwan’s particular history of democratization.
In his synthesis of research on modernist knowledge production, James Scott (1998) explains how state bureaucracies often simplify the matters they oversee, making them more
manageable in the short run by obscuring key factors that ultimately defeat management. By
unpacking bureaucrats’ complex speech choices, I have tried to avoid simplifying bureaucracy itself. I treat government employees as complexly motivated individuals implicated
in multiple institutional roles and social relations. I present their language choices as more
than merely assertions of institutional authority or ethnic identity. Although ethnic identity
is a highly salient form of belonging, it does not suffice to explain the common linguistic
choices of Taipei administrators; that requires a more complex description that is populated
by more participants. Relatedly, bureaucratic speech is easy to present as a statement of
governments’ superiority over other social institutions. Again, this highly visible form of
belonging does not explain administrators’ actual, complex and creative, language choices.
Instead of looking for one central synapse that would express governmental power and
explain administrators’ language choices, I suggest that understanding the situations I
present requires viewing these bureaucrats as embedded in multiple, interacting, social
spheres. This complicated, multiperspectival view, I argue, has benefits for the study of
bureaucracy. It allows for an analysis of government action that does not rely on categories
created or recognized by that very government. For example, it does not peg an understanding of language choice on politicized categories of ethnicized belonging or government
employment. Rather, it allows commentators to see how such categories are mobilized at
some points but undermined at others. It also encourages attention to the situations in which
such categories recede in relevance or become fuzzy around the edges.
Relatedly, this approach presents government bureaucracy, much like other social institutions, as both a fully integrated part of society and a somewhat distinctive sphere of
action and relation. In that sense, this multiperspectival approach helps situate bureaucracy
as an always localized phenomenon; that is, a loose organizational form that maintains
certain similarities over times and places, but is always situated within, and reflective of,
very particular sociocultural contexts and historical trajectories, with their attendant values,
beliefs, and practices.
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Perhaps most satisfyingly, my approach allows scholars to see, and relate to, bureaucrats
as full participants in their society, illuminating the possibility of creative and progressive
action even within seemingly drab and dehumanized settings. I would not claim that all
bureaucracies resemble the one I worked in. I hope, however, that I have shown that
a complete understanding of bureaucracy must be able to accommodate the patterns I
describe as a potential, not anomalous, aspect of bureaucratic functioning.

Notes
This article benefited greatly from conversations with Nicholas Day, David Engel, Jessica
Greenberg, and Jeffrey Martin, as well as from extremely helpful comments from anonymous reviewers. I am grateful for the Fulbright-Hays fellowship that supported this research
and for the Blakemore fellowship that funded my language coursework at the International
Chinese Language Program.
1. This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork. I spent roughly one year living in the
Dali Street neighborhood, both working and socializing with Dali Street Cultural Association members. I then spent roughly nine months working with administrators in
the Taipei City Government Bureau of Urban Development. For the first three of those
months, I undertook interviews and conversations with administrators at the bureau’s
urban renewal office outpost near Dali Street. I then spent six months as a full-time
volunteer in the bureau’s central city hall office, where I worked as the department’s
English language consultant. I spent my days interacting with administrators: I talked
with them; sat in on their meetings with other government employees, consultants, and
members of the public; and accompanied them on inspections, offsite meetings, lunch
outings, weekend hikes, dinners, and other activities. I observed hundreds of meetings
and less formal interactions, and had hundreds of conversations with administrators
from across the bureau, as well as from other departments. I also recorded roughly
thirty hours of open-ended, semistructured interviews with administrators at every
level of the organization, from bureau head to low-level functionary. Like many ethnographers, though, I found that my primary material came not from interviews, which
record the stories people told when asked to tell stories, but rather from the off-hand remarks, unreflective answers, and real-time commentaries—to me and to others—that
characterize the bureau’s lively social life. Except for an English language practice
lunch I headed a few times, all these interactions took place in some combination
of Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese. (Like other educated Taiwanese speakers, administrators also occasionally interject English words into Chinese speech.) I render
Mandarin quotations in pinyin transliteration and Chinese characters; Taiwanese quotations in Missionary Romanization (Taiwanese does not have standardized characters).
Where I do not have exact wording, I give the gist of an utterance in English translation
only. I use pseudonyms for my interlocutors.
2. Taipei’s official population density hovers above 9,500 people per square kilometer.
(For comparison, New York City houses roughly 1,800 people per square kilometer).
Because almost a third of the city’s area comprises a national park, and because many
people do not change their official registration to Taipei when they move from other
parts of Taiwan, the lived density is even higher.
3. For more on this neighborhood and its Cultural Association, see Bernstein (2006),
Chen (2002), Chen (2000).
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4. For more on the importance of earnest concern to political action in Taiwan, see
Bernstein (2006), Martin (2007).
5. “Ni zhiyao gen ta jiang , ‘Ying guache chi?’ soahsoahkhi.”
6. For social etymologies that survey the term’s range of meanings, see Albrow (1970)
and Kafka (2012). Another Kafka ([1925] 1998a, [1926] 1998b), of course, provides
some of the most enduring images of bureaucracy.
7. McCormick (1997) discusses a similar view in Carl Schmitt ([1922] 1985a;
[1926] 1985b; [1932] 2004). Although Max Weber’s (1978) classic exposition presents bureaucracy in a more positive light, it also presents a
rather mechanistic, predictable organization subsuming the characteristics of
individuals.
8. For the importance of cooperation and consensus to political action in Taiwan, see
Bernstein (2008). In a related vein, Jeffrey Martin describes one aspect of political
legitimation in Taiwan as “self-consciously . . . organized by values of intimate solidarity defined in explicit opposition to abstract legal principles” (2013, 616). Martin
found this intimate legitimation in the context of police authority; I found something
similar among administrators.
9. This language is sometimes known as Taiyü  or Taiwanhua ÿ (Taiwanese
language), sometimes as Minnanyü   (Southern Min language). A speaker’s
choice of what to call the language itself can suggest political opinions with respect
to Taiwan’s relationship to mainland China. For example, calling the local language
Southern Min can signal the view that Taiwan is, politically or culturally, a part of
China, while calling it Taiwanese can indicate the attribution of cultural uniqueness
and independence to the island. Similarly, whether Taiwanese is a “language” or a
“dialect” is a politically fraught issue. For more on Taiwan’s colonial history, see Ka
(1995) and Myers and Peattie (1984).
10. Those who came with the KMT and their descendants are often called “Mainlanders” in English (Waishengren ; outside-the-province people in Mandarin).
Descendants of pre-1895 migrants are often called “Taiwanese” in English (Benshengren ; this-province people in Mandarin). The latter group comprises
84 percent to 85.5 percent of the island’s population. This includes both people
whose ancestors came from Fujian and the Hakka, a Chinese minority from provinces
other than Fujian that is treated as a distinguishable subset of the local (bentu
  [this land]), non-Mainlander population. Hakka make up 10 percent to 12
percent of the population; Mainlanders 13 percent to 14 percent; and indigenous
people 1.7 percent to 2 percent (Government Information Office 2003; Huang
1988).
11. Mandarin is usually called Guoyü  (national language), and sometimes Huayü
 (Chinese language). It is mutually incomprehensible with Taiwanese. Mandarin on Taiwan has some local characteristics, but it is very similar to Mandarin in
China (Putonghua  [common language]), and the two are completely mutually
comprehensible.
12. Studies of language distribution and language ideology on Taiwan often suffer from
what Judith Irvine has identified as a propensity to rely on concepts such as “social evaluation, attitudes, scales of prestige, . . . schemes of values, [and] . . . social
identity . . . as if they could be taken as obvious . . . [and] needed no independent
investigation” (2001, 24).

May 2017

Page 45

13. This process, seen as an effort to head off mass disaffection, did not prevent regime
change, but probably contributed to the continuing legitimacy of the KMT after
democratization (Chun 2000).
14. I should note that my fieldwork, and most of my time, was spent in Taipei, which is
known to be a heavily Mandarin-speaking area. In the south, many more people speak
Taiwanese as a primary language. In my experience, however, many such people also
can speak Mandarin if they need to.
15. This equanimous attitude toward language acquisition fits with Taiwan’s generally
multilingual culture. Everyone knows at least some people who speak or read more than
two languages well, be it English, Japanese, Hakka, or one of the surviving indigenous
languages. Many more people speak or read some of these languages to some lesser
extent. The Taiwanese Internet, for example, is chock full of puns involving various
combinations of Mandarin, Taiwanese, Japanese, and English, written in combinations
of Chinese characters, Japanese syllables, Roman letters, Mandarin Phonetic Symbols,
and numbers.
16. For more on the relation of internal and external identity in Taiwan, see Allen (2005);
Bosco (1994); Chun (1996; 2000); Corcuffe (2002).
17. This expectation does not extend to Hakka or the indigenous languages.
18. To be clear, I do not claim that code switching is a sign of democracy in itself.
Rather, it provides an avenue for the construction of democratic identities in Taiwan’s
particular sociopolitical trajectory; it is a tool available to people in Taiwan, which my
interlocutors in the city government used in a particular way.
19. Many administrators are trained at National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute
of Building and Planning, known for Marxist theoretical innovation and qualitative
analysis, or at National Cheng-Kung University’s Department of Urban Planning,
known for rigorous practical training and quantitative approaches.
20. These terms combine the word for study (xue ) with regular sibling terms,
which specify gender and birth order, to indicate relative graduation order (e.g.,
younger brother in study; xuedi  ). Classmates are tongxue   (togetherstudents).
21. For example, my landlady got nervous when a friend (pengyou ÿ) planned to stay
with me, but when I mentioned that this friend was a college classmate (tongxue 
), she readily agreed—a classmate, she made clear, was a different story than a mere
friend.
22. In contrast, the first floor of city hall holds a series of desks staffed by employees from
each city department, who handle common administrative tasks.
23. Taipei elected its mayors from 1947 until 1967, when the central government began
appointing mayors after a non-KMT candidate won a second term (Rigger 1999, 2001).
24. “Ta zhibuzhichi ni buguan .”
25. “kao minzhong de xuanpiao . . . yao ting tade.”
26. Taiwanese weddings are huge affairs funded largely through monetary gifts from
guests, and invitations are distributed broadly. Showing up is a way of supporting the
couple’s social status.
27. For an overview and critique of the concept of capture, see Novak (2013).
28. This attitude is likely not unique to Taiwan. Robert Kagan (2001) explains that the
American view of cooperation and capture in the administrative state is anomalous
(and inefficient).
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29. Someone from every social group I came in contact with in Taiwan told me that
Taiwan was “too democratic” (tai minzhu ). When pressed, people would
generally explain this statement with references to a loss of consensus (gongshi 
) on public issues—a consensus those same people often admitted had been created
through force under martial law—and a breakdown of social norms. As one activist
put it when I asked her what she meant by it, “[People] even cuss out the president!”
(“Dou ma zongtong ah ”).
30. “Yiqian de guanyuan dou naqian, yao chi, yao he , . . . .
Tamen qing women chifan, women chi biandang . Tamen
qing women he dongxi, women he kaishui ÿ. Ni zhidao
tamen duome gandong ? Conglai meiyou kandao xiang women
zheyangzi de guanyuan ÿ. Suoyi yihou tamen ye
bijiao buhao yisi gen women chaojia 
.”
31. “Wo yijing male haojige minzhong ÿ.”
32. “Lai, lai, lai, che chia, che chia!”
33. Mandarin nicknames place lao  (old) or xiao  (young) before a family name;
Taiwanese nicknames place the interjection “ah” before one syllable of a given name.
34. “Ni gen ta jiang yi, ta bu hui jiang er  ,   .”
35. “Guzhang yi bu zai zheige anzi jiu    ÿÿdit-dit dit-dit kian , meiyou
bianhua , ah ranhou jiu ÿ siki ah.”
36. “Xian fa gongwen zhengshi qing dajia lai ÿ, ah ranhou 
 . . . ho in si.”
37. “Wo zhao kuaijishi wen, zenme chuli  .”
38. “Ah kuaijishi shuo , ah gua m-chai oh.”
39. “Jiao wo zhao kezhang .”
40. “Ah kezhang shuo , ah gua m-chai oh.”
41. Two of the Cultural Association leaders were Hakka but spoke Taiwanese natively.
Over the course of my fieldwork, I had enough interactions with most people in the
room that day to know their ethnolinguistic heritages.
42. The success of the recent Sunflower Movement, in which student activists occupied
the national legislature to protest the closed-door passage of a trade agreement with
the PRC, exemplifies that conversation at the national level (Rowan 2015).
43. Such demands were often accompanied by widely publicized demonstrations as well
as strategically organized festivals, in which public figures were put on the spot and
asked to express support for local initiatives. For example, the Cultural Association
organized a yearly Sugarcane Festival to commemorate the area’s plantation history.
During my fieldwork, the president, vice president, and mayor all appeared and made
speeches at the festival.
44. Thiau-ah-kha “pull votes” (lapiao ) for their preferred candidates by “chatting
(tan )” with their plentiful acquaintances—“chat” being preferred over “convince”
(shuifu ÿ), for these conversations among social equals (cf. Moon 1998). Unlike
their closest American parallel, ward bosses, the thiau-ah-kha are not seen to control a
voter’s employment prospects but to connect constituents to elected officials who can
then distribute favors. Such favors include things like pressuring city administrators to
refrain from implementing city ordinances in ways that are disadvantageous for those
constituents (something many of my coworkers complained of), as well as pressuring
them to accede to constituents’ affirmative demands for more services.
45. “Women zai shizhengfu hen youming .”
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